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Abstract
This paper adapts in a simple static context the Rogo¤s (1985) analysis
of monetary policy delegation to a conservative central banker to the robust
control framework. In this framework, uncertainty means that policymakers
are unsure about their model, in the sense that there is a group of approximate
models that they also consider as possibly true, and their objective is to choose
a rule that will work under a range of di¤erent model specications. We nd
that robustness reveals the emergence of a precautionary behaviour in the case
of unstructured model uncertainty, reducing thus governments willingness to
delegate monetary policy to a conservative central banker.
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1 Introduction
In a seminal paper Rogo¤(1985) suggested that, by appointing a conservative central
banker with a more important inationary aversion than the whole society, social
welfare could be improved with respect to discretionary equilibrium. This proposi-
tion, adopted by the majority of countries during the last two decades, reduces the
ination bias arising from discretionary monetary policies (Kydland and Prescott,
1977 and Barro and Gordon, 1983). Thus the choice of optimally inationary aver-
sion would nd the socially best balance between the output stabilisation and prices
in response to supply shocks hitting the economy.
However, in this framework policymakers are assumed to know the true model
of the economy and observe accurately all relevant macroeconomic variables. Un-
certainty arises from the unknown future realisations of the supply shocks, assumed
to be modelled according to some stochastic process whose properties is known.
Unfortunately, the reality is much more complex. The policymakers choice is made
in the fare of tremendous uncertainty about the true structure of the economy, the
impact policy actions have on the economy, and even about the current state of the
economy. This complexity means that a certain degree of subjectivity enters into
the actual decision making when deciding upon optimal monetary policy. In other
words, the policymaker is unsure about his model, in the sense that there is a group
of approximate models that he also considers as possibly true.
This raises the question of how a monetary policy rule should be selected in
the face of uncertainty about the correct model of the economy. In fact, solutions
to the expected value problem by standard optimal control methods do not deliver
the best average performance if they are applied to an incorrect model. Because
uncertainty is pervasive, it is important to understand how alternative policies work
when the policymaker employs a model of the economy that is incorrect in unknown
ways. Therefore, the resulting problem is one of robust control, in the sense of
Hansen and Sargent (2004), where the objective is to choose a rule that will work
under a range of di¤erent model specications. The notion that policy decisions
may be more robust if based on systematically distorted model of the economy is a
key implication of the recent research on robustness control or uncertainty aversion
literature (Onatski and Williams, 2003; Giordani and Söderlind, 2004; Leitemo and
Söderström, 2004; Walsh, 2004).
This paper adapts robust control approach to the problem of monetary policy
delegation to a conservative central banker in a simple static context in order to
illustrate the basic intuition behind this new approach to uncertainty. In this con-
text, it is particular important to give an answer to the question whether model
uncertainty can a¤ect the governments optimal commitment to ght ination, as
well as his will to delegate the conduct of monetary policy to a conservative central
banker. In this framework, we nd that robustness of a monetary policy rule reveals
the emergence of a precautionary behaviour in the case of policymakers unstruc-
tured model uncertainty, reducing thus willingness to delegate monetary policy to a
conservative central banker.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets up a one-period model
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of monetary policy. Section 3 de-rives the discretionary equilibrium under robust
control. Section 4 derives the optimal degree of central banker conservativeness.
Section 5 summarises the main conclusions.
2 The model
In this section, we apply the basic idea of robust control to a simple static model
of monetary policy delegation originally developed in Rogo¤ (1985) in which poli-
cymaker sets ination according to the following augmented Phillips curve:
x = e    + + h (1)
where x  u   u is the gap between the unemployment rate u and the natural
rate of unemployment u > 0,  is the ination rate, e is the rationally expected
ination rate,  is a random variable with mean zero and variance 1, and h is an
additional deterministic disturbance component which introduce ambiguity of the
model. The two disturbances terms and have di¤erent properties. The term  is
assumed to be a random error with a prior known stochastic properties, whilst
h represents in the spirit of robust control (Hansen and Sargent, 2004) a totally
ambiguous model misspecication error, in the sense that the policymaker is not
able to assign any prior probability distribution to h. The model with h = 0
represents the reference model, while the models with h 6= 0 represent candidate
models surrounding the reference model. The size of the distortion term h must
be bounded as the policymaker has some information on the process. Hence, we
assume that the magnitude of the square of the specication error veries:
h2  2 (2)
where the parameter 2 bounds the square of the governments specication error
h2. Restriction (2), together with equation (1), denes a set of models that the
government considers as being possible outcomes in the sense that the policymaker
does not know exactly the position of the Phillips curve in the space (x, e   ).
The governments preferences are described by the following standard quadratic
utility function:
Us =  1
2
 
u2 + 2

(3)
where the government is assumed to stabilise unemployment u and ination  around
their target values, which are for simplicity xed to zero. According to Rogo¤
(1985), monetary policy is delegated by the government to a "conservative" central
banker, whose decision making problem is presented by the following quadratic
utility function:
Ucb =  1
2

u2 + (1 + )2

(4)
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where  > 0 is the degree of conservativeness chosen by the government and is the
optimal extra (relative) weight the central banker sets on ination stabilisation1.
3 Discretion under robust control
According to the robust control approach, in order to hedge against the model am-
biguity, the policymaker makes a particular subjective assessment of h . In other
words, he chooses the worst case (h 6= 0) at any given e and then designs corre-
sponding monetary policy rule  which maximises the utility at given h. In order to
introduce such subjective assessment of h into the decision making problem, we re-
place the standard quadratic utility function (4) by an uncertainty aversionutility
function and we seek a solution to the following problem:
max

min
h
U =  1
2

u2 + (1 + )2

+

2
h2 (5)
The design of a robust policy rule becomes now a max-min problem, where the
optimal level of ination is found by maximizing U , with h being chosen to minimize
U subject to the linear constraint (1).  is a xed penalty parameter which reects
both the government and the central bankers desired degree of robustness. In
other words, we assume that the government and the central banker share the same
doubts about the accuracy of the model of the economy.  > 1 can be interpreted
as a Lagrangian multiplier on constraint (2). The value  = 1 is the breakdown
point to be discussed later. The value for  would be endogenous in the constrained
Lagrangian, and it would be associated to the specic  value used in the constraint
(2). The way the problem is written here,  is chosen directly and the constraint is
adapted accordingly. Note also that larger values of  imply smaller sets of models
so that  is an indicator of the precautionary behaviour of the authorities. In other
words, the more  is close to one, the more the government is insuring about the
accuracy of the model it uses. In the opposite case, as  ! +1, the government
believes that its model is a good approximation of the true model of the economy.
In the limit case where  = +1, there is no misspecication and the government is
convinced that the model it uses is the true one. From the rst order conditions for
 and h in the problem (5), we obtain respectively the reaction functions:
() =

 + (1 + )(   1)(u
 + + e) (6)
h() =
(1 + )
 + (1 + )(   1)(u
 + + e) (7)
where () gives the central bankers (robust) best reaction function for setting  as
a function of e, while h() determines the worst case model, given e and the central
bankers setting () . Then, using equation (6) and assuming rational expectations
of the private sector (e = E) yields:
1Rogo¤ (1985) demonstrates that the optimal extra (relative) weight the central banker sets on
ination is nite and strictly positive.
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e() =
u
(1 + )(   1) (8)
By substituting equation (8) into equation (6), the time-consistent rational expec-
tations equilibrium ination rate is:
() =
u
(1 + )(   1) +

 + (1 + )(   1) (9)
From equation (9), it is clear that as  ! 1, the model breaks down as the equilib-
rium ination rate tends to innity. Finally, substituting equations (7), (8) and (9)
into equation (1), we obtain the equilibrium rate of unemployment:
u() =
u
(   1) +
(1 + )
 + (1 + )(   1) (10)
Using equations (9) and (10), we can see that when  ! +1 there is no concern
for model misspecication as h(1) = 0 and thus the standard rational expectation
model arises. The equilibrium ination rate and unemployment gap are given by
(1) = u

(1 + )
+

1 + (1 + )
(11)
u(1) = u + (1 + )
1 + (1 + )
(12)
Using equations (9) to (12), we establish the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If the approximating model is true (i.e.,  = +1, and therefore
h(1) = 0), so that the policymakers concern about misspecication is misplaced,
the central banker sets both ination and unemployment higher than if he knew the
model for sure. In other words, when the approximating model is correct, robust
policies sacrice macroeconomic performance.
Proof. This result straightforwardly follows from the respective comparison of
equations (9) and (11) and equations (10) and (12).
However, it can be easily shown that as the specication error increases (i.e.,
as the parameter  decreases) the deterioration of the macroeconomic performances
are lower under the robust policy (see also Hansen and Sargent, 2004, chap. 5).
4 The optimal conservativeness
We now consider the governments optimal appointment of a conservative central
banker. As the government chooses optimally the central banker,  must be solved
endogenously in order to maximise the governments expected utility. Our objective
is to analyse how the precautionary behaviour of the government (captured by )
a¤ects the optimal choice about the characteristics of the central banker (i.e., his
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degree of conservativeness ). Thus, using equations (9) and (10) into the govern-
ment utility function (3), we derive the govern-ments expected utility as a function
of :
E(Us) =  1
2
2
"
1 + (1 + )2 (u)2
(1 + )2(   1)2 +
1 + (1 + )2
[ + (1 + )(   1)]2
#
(13)
Then we derive equation (13) with respect to  and we obtain the following rst-
order condition :
@E(Us)
@
= 0 ) f(; ) = (1 + )(1 + )
3(   1)2
[ + (1 + )(   1)]2   (u
)2 = 0 (14)
Using equation (14), we establish the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The more government desires a robust monetary policy rule suitable
to the uncertainty about the true structure of the economy, the less he needs to
appoint a conservative central banker with a high degree of inationary aversion.
Proof. From equation (14) and remembering that  > 1, we can write:
@f(; )
@
=
(1 + )2(   1)2 [(1 + ) + 3(1 + ) + (1 + )2(   1)]
[ + (1 + )(   1)]4 > 0 (15)
and
@f(; )
@
=  (1 + )
3(   1) [(2 + )2(   1)  2(1 + )]
[ + (1 + )(   1)]4 < 0 (16)
if  > 1 +
2(1 + )
(2 + )2
(17)
Note that inequality (16) holds only if condition (17) is veried. However, condition
(17) is not restrictive since it is veried as soon as  > 1:5 . In fact, as  > 0 it is
obvious that 2(1 + )=(2 + )2  0:5. For example if  = 1, condition (17) becomes
 > 1:444 and if  = 2, condition (17)becomes  > 1:375. In other words, more the
central banker is independent and conservative and more the condition (17) can be
veried. Applying the implicit function rule, we obtain :
@
@
=  @f(; )=@
@f(; )=@
> 0 (18)
According to the Proposition 2, the governments robust choice of  reveals the
emergence of a precautionary behaviour in the case of uncertainty about the true
structure of the economy, reducing its willingness to delegate monetary policy to a
conservativecentral banker. In other words, the more uncertain the governments
model is, the more reluctant the government should be to appoint a conservative
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central banker. The intuition behind this proposition is that, as the structure of the
economy is uncertain, it becomes optimal for the government to accept a central
banker characterised by a low degree of conservativeness in order to implement a
more exible monetary policy, which will work well over a larger set of possible
alternative models.
5 Conclusion
This paper adapts the robust control approach, in the sense of Hansen and Sargent
(2004), to the Rogo¤s (1985) seminal analysis of monetary policy delegation to a
conservative central banker, when there is misspecication uncertainties about the
model of the economy. We show that the governments robust choice reveals the
emergence of a precautionary behaviour in the case of uncertainty about the true
structure of the economy, reducing its willingness to delegate monetary policy to a
conservative central banker with a high degree of ination aversion. The intuition
behind this result is that it becomes optimal to appoint a central banker with a low
degree of conservativeness in order to implement a exible monetary policy.
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